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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Over the past 15 years, U.S. corporations have searched desperately for ways to turn back stiff 
foreign competition. One of their strategies has been subcontracting—letting work out to outside firms, so 
as to gain access to both better production techniques and cheaper, more docile labor. Responding to 
subcontracting will be one of the principal challenges facing labor in the 1990s. The impact of 
subcontracting has already been quite severe, particularly for unionized workers. Tens of thousands of 
workers have lost their jobs, and others have taken pay cuts. Unions are responding to this challenge by 
using both collective bargaining and public policy mechanisms. This article will focus on innovative 
efforts by two unions: the Steelworkers (USWA) and the Auto Workers (UAW). It is not surprising that both 
these examples come from heavy manufacturing, since this was the unionized sector first hit by foreign 
competition; other sectors have not been faced with the problem as severely until recently. Even though 
the circumstances may differ, workers in sectors as diverse as hospitals, telecommunications and airlines 
can learn from the auto and steel industry experience because in these industries, deregulation has 
intensified competition in much the same way that the rise of foreign competition has affected 
manufacturing. 
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Contracting Out 
In the Private Sector 
Subcontracting 
Innovative Labor Strategies 
• Sue Helper 
Over the past 15 years, U.S. corporations have searched desperately 
for ways to turn back stiff foreign competition. One of their 
strategies has been subcontracting—letting work out to outside 
firms, so as to gain access to both better production techniques 
and cheaper, more docile labor. 
Responding to subcontracting will be one of the principal 
challenges facing labor in the 1990s. The impact of subcontract-
ing has already been quite severe, particularly for unionized 
workers. Tens of thousands of workers have lost their jobs, and 
others have taken pay cuts. 
Unions are responding to this challenge by using both collective 
bargaining and public policy mechanisms. This article will focus 
on innovative efforts by two unions: the Steelworkers (USWA) and 
the Auto Workers (UAW). It is not surprising that both these 
examples come from heavy manufacturing, since this was the 
unionized sector first hit by foreign competition; other sectors have 
not been faced with the problem as severely until recently. Even 
though the circumstances may differ, workers in sectors as diverse 
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as hospitals, telecommunications and airlines can learn from the 
auto and steel industry experience because in these industries, 
deregulation has intensified competition in much the same way 
that the rise of foreign competition has affected manufacturing. 
Why Firms Subcontract 
In the short-lived "American Century" between 1945 and 1975, 
oligopolistic firms like Ford, General Motors and US Steel, unchal-
lenged either at home or abroad, became huge organizations with 
highly capital-intensive production processes. They were able to 
make profits with such high fixed costs only if they maintained 
a high rate of output. Disruptions to that rate of output, such as 
supply shortages, became the manufacturing executive's worst 
nightmare. Key to these firms' strategy for maintaining continuous 
operations was establishing direct control over all aspects of 
production, from raw material to finished product. 
Manufacturing executives knew that supply disruptions could 
be caused not only by sloppy management at a supplier firm, but 
also by unhappy workers in their own plants. To avoid this 
possibility, they were willing to pay relatively high wages to 
workers throughout their vertically-integrated organizations in 
return for wide latitude in managing the shopfloor. Because most 
large corporations concluded that organized labor was a lesser evil 
than disruptive work stoppages, they usually did not oppose 
organizing drives in their plants. 
While it lasted, Big Labor and Big Capital had a fairly conve-
nient arrangement. Big Capital made large profits by controlling 
its markets, and Big Labor shared in some of those profits as the 
price of labor peace. 
As U.S. corporations have become subject to foreign competition 
during the past two decades, they've responded with two strategies 
(or sometimes with combinations of the two). The first strategy, 
innovation, involves developing new techniques to cut costs or 
improve quality by increasing efficiency or "working smarter." 
The second strategy, adaptation, aims to cut costs using existing 
techniques—suppliers and workers do the same thing, only cheaper 
and faster. Both of these responses may involve subcontracting. 
Innovation may lead corporations to use more outside suppliers 
for several reasons. First, as corporations strive to improve product 
quality, they find it necessary to pay stricter attention to detail 
than before. As a result, individual plants find they have to focus 
on just a few activities. For example, automotive assembly plants 
used to be responsible for assembling cars piece by piece; 5,000 
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separate parts came into the plant. This number was more than 
anyone could really pay attention to; minor problems were ignored 
in the interests of keeping the plant running. Now, the automakers 
are moving toward modularization— having components suppliers 
do some of the assembly themselves. 
A second reason that corporations which have adopted the inno-
vation strategy use more outside suppliers is that innovation may 
require the use of technologies that are not available in-house. In 
automobiles, for example, technology is changing in virtually every 
aspect of the product: electronic systems (such as electronic fuel 
injection) are replacing mechanical devices (such as carburetors); 
materials such as plastics, ceramics, and aluminum are replacing 
steel. One firm simply cannot keep up with all the technologies 
involved in making all the components of a car. Therefore, 
automakers are decentralizing. For example, Ford has given TRW 
Safety Systems responsibility for all safety devices on Ford cars: 
air bags and associated electronics, seat belts, etc. This arrrange-
ment allows Ford to focus on those matters in which it has the 
most expertise, such as design of the car, final assembly, and 
marketing. 
A third reason that the innovation strategy leads corporations 
to choose outside suppliers is that in-house suppliers tend to take 
up too much scarce top management time—there is no way for 
corporate management to commit itself not to intervene in the 
affairs of its subsidiaries, and it is hard to distinguish a good inter-
vention from a bad intervention ahead of time. 
The adaptation strategy can also lead to subcontracting. Outside 
suppliers can often be found who will do what at least appears 
to be the same work for far less cost, due to their avoidance of 
union wages and work rules. 
The adaptation strategy is likely to be profitable only in the short 
run, since there are limits to how far one can squeeze. However, 
it may be sufficiently profitable in the short run that it appeals 
to managers and stockholders who want to use the business as 
a cash cow, driving out the possibility of long-term improvement. 
Collective Bargaining Responses to Subcontracting 
Restricting Outsourcing 
One approach to the problems caused by subcontracting for 
workers is to try to ban it outright. The USWA has used this 
strategy, with some success. 
The USWA's contract is explicit: "the guiding principle is that 
work capable of being performed by bargaining unit employees 
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shall be performed by such employees.'' This statement is weakened 
by several conditions, but remains quite strong. The company 
must notify the union before any outsourcing occurs. If the union 
local thinks it has a case, it can ask for "expedited arbitration," 
which means that a board of arbiters is supposed to decide the 
case within 10 days; the work cannot be contracted out until the 
board has ruled. 
The effectiveness of these provisions varies a great deal, depend-
ing on the degree of organization of the union local and the intran-
sigence of management. 
For example, Local 1010 in East Chicago, Indiana, a 10,000-
member unit with a history of rank-and-file activism, has kept 
300 jobs in-house as a result of the agreement. "We have 
eliminated the problem of contracting out; if we're capable of 
performing the work, we do it," declares local president Mike 
Mezo. The union's role has changed a great deal as a result of the 
agreement—30% of the staff (3 people) work full-time monitoring 
the agreement, and the union as a whole is much more involved 
in management. In what Mezo describes as "on-going war" with 
Inland Steel management, the union has forced the company to 
buy a $600,000 milling machine and other equipment rather than 
contract out some work. "It drives them crazy to have union 
people making management decisions. They keep saying they 
want to co-manage the plant with us—but the only time they say 
that is after we force them to." 
In contrast, Local 1014 at the Gary Works of USX has had even 
less cooperative management to work with, and lacks a history 
of the rank-and-file activism necessary to achieve the constant 
vigilance necessary to enforce the agreement. Paul Hashiguchi, 
the contracting-out chairman, filed 4,000 grievances himself in 
1987 and again in 1988. (The number was down to 2,000 last year). 
First he had to fight a battle to get USX to notify him of plans 
to contract out. After many grievances over this issue, the company 
now notifies him, but so many of the company's practices violate 
the bargaining agreement that "expedited" arbitration takes three 
months instead of the normal ten days. 
The proposed contract cannot be let until the arbiter has ruled, 
so USX's intransigence hampers its day-to-day operations and 
costs "millions and millions" in back pay. In contrast to Local 
1010, Local 1014 has not had the luxury of fighting the company 
for new equipment; Hashiguchi is still trying to get USX to in-
source work that was illegally outsourced between 1983 and 1986. 
Another battle is to get the company to hire new workers as 
volume increases and older workers retire, rather than use lack 
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of labor power as an excuse to subcontract. 
Negotiating Income Security 
Another union strategy is to accept outsourcing, but to force 
employers to pay the costs of dislocating workers. This approach 
has been taken by the UAW in negotiating the Job Opportunity 
Bank-Security (JOBS) Program at the Big Three automakers. 
Under this program, the number of active workers with more 
than a year's seniority in 1987 determined the initial "secured 
employment level" (SEL) for each plant. For every two slots 
opened by attrition, the SEL decreases by one. For every new 
worker hired or recalled from layoff after a certain number of 
weeks, the SEL increases by one. Except for reasons of declining 
volume, no worker with more than a year's seniority can be laid 
off if it puts the plant below its SEL. 
If workers are not directly needed in production (due, for 
example, to subcontracting or technical change), they go into the 
JOBS Bank at full pay with no loss of seniority—at least until either 
the contract ends or the automakers' agreed-upon liability runs 
out. (GM's liability is $ 1.3 billion for the 1987-90 contract.) In the 
JOBS Bank, employees may receive schooling or job training, 
substitute for another worker who is being trained, or receive a 
"non-traditional assignment," which could be investigating 
customer claims of poor quality or fixing up a park in the com-
munity. In addition, they can choose the Voluntary Termination 
of Employment Program (VTEP), in which they are paid a lump 
sum ranging from $12,000 (for workers with 1-2 years' seniority) 
to $65,000 (for those with more than 25 years). 
A particularly heavy user of the JOBS Bank program has been 
the AC Rochester plant in Rochester, New York. This GM plant 
has been hard hit, first by the obsolescence of its product, car-
buretors. This change took away 1,132 jobs between October 1985 
and February 1989; 379 more were lost due to productivity 
improvements and outsourcing. At first the local relied on the Jobs 
Bank program. 476 people retired under the VTEP program, and 
259 left under other programs. By February 1990, 793 people (21% 
of total employment at the plant) were left in the Bank. 
Local union officials call the JOBS Bank ' 'a fantastic program.'' 
Not only has it averted massive layoffs, it has allowed people to 
gain new skills. Since the Bank began, 700 people have obtained 
their GED; others have received training in finance and cost 
estimation. Currently, 170 AC Rochester employees are full-time 
college students (two-thirds of whom are on the Dean's List). The 
Bank has provided the labor hours to allow the plant to take a 
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pro-active approach to health and safety issues, and to provide 
substance abuse and AIDS awareness programs. When salaried 
jobs become vacant, a JOBS Bank employee can fill in if qualified; 
for example, the plant used to hire a lot of temporary clerical help, 
but that practice has been eliminated. 
However, having such a large number of people in the bank has 
had unanticipated consequences: equity issues are very difficult 
since there is no comparable program for salaried employees, and 
because low-seniority employees can jump directly from the Bank 
to prime first-shift jobs. Resolving these issues has taken a great 
deal of union and management time. A UAW newsletter proclaimed 
on March 1, 1989, 'There is not a manufacturing plant in the 
world that is required to assign almost 800 people job assignments 
that are totally different from what these union members were 
hired to perform!! Think about it! The size of our Bank has become 
the focal point of all management and union discussions, decisions, 
and future direction." 
Besides the administrative problems, the JOBS Bank provides 
"only income security, not job security," says Bill Dell, the UAW's 
joint program coordinator. If fewer active employees are needed 
due to a volume decrease, then people currently working will 
move to the JOBS Bank, and those in the Bank will be laid off. 
' 'While the JOBS Bank program has allowed us to do a lot of nifty 
stuff, until the people in the Bank have real jobs, we're not where 
we want to be." 
Insourcing 
Because of the problems with the JOBS Bank, the AC Rochester 
local has adopted a strategy intermediate between the two 
extremes of trying to block subcontracting completely and of 
acquiescing in it as long as the company provides income security. 
This strategy leaves the final sourcing decision to management, 
but provides a mechanism for internal suppliers to bid to keep 
the work in-house. In this strategy, the union tries to convince 
management to join in what ex-UAW staffer Dan Luria calls a 
"productivity coalition." The goal is to increase (or at least 
maintain) both profits and wages by means of changes which 
reduce costs or improve revenues. To implement such a strategy, 
the union offers to trade relaxation of work rules, suggestions for 
improved operations, and sometimes wage concessions in return 
for guarantees of job security and increased investment by 
management. 
At AC Rochester, the existence of the JOBS Bank has been key 
to the implementation of a productivity coalition. The protection 
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provided by the Bank led the union to agree in 1986 to combine 
job classifications, moving from 112 production classifications to 
about 20, and from six tooling trades to one. These changes have 
reduced costs by an estimated $20 million. According to Dell, 
"Sometimes you have to give up 200 jobs to save 2,000. The alter-
native is to stay stuck in the mud until everyone drowns." 
The existence of the JOBS Bank has provided the labor to 
analyze sources of inefficiency. Two years ago, an energy task force 
saved $5 million in its first week. Almost all of the skilled workers 
have been trained in cost estimation, and internal shops now 
routinely get to bid on jobs which used to automatically go outside. 
UAW Local 1097 has saved jobs at AC Rochester not only by 
reducing out-of-pocket costs, but by convincing management to 
follow the logic of their own arguments about the importance of 
quality improvement and inventory reduction. Management 
wanted to outsource deburring, but the union saved 80 jobs when 
it persuaded management that inventory reductions offset the 
higher cost of doing the job in-house. Another 30 jobs came back 
when a machining subcontractor had trouble meeting the pro-
duction schedule. 
In 1986, Local 1097 and AC Rochester established the Compe-
titive Edge program, which uses worker suggestions and up to $20 
million in GM money to create new businesses. However, the 
program has had "minimal" success, according to Dell, "because 
GM insists that the investments pay back in a year or so—tough 
to do if you're starting a new venture. . . If, as they say, people 
are our greatest resource, then why not bring work in even if it 
just breaks even? Our relationships are good with plant manage-
ment. But, unfortunately, the people we talk with day to day can't 
cure our ills—local management doesn't have the authority to 
bring in a new product line, or even to spend $100,000 for a 
machine." 
What Should Unions Do? 
When a union is faced with a management decision to subcon-
tract, which response should it choose? There is no single answer. 
Each of the three strategies outlined above—limiting subcontract-
ing, negotiating income security, and insourcing—is appropriate 
in some situations and not others. It all depends on why manage-
ment has decided to subcontract in the first place. 
If management is primarily following an "adaptive" strategy, 
in pursuit of cheaper labor, it will be tough for the union to create 
a productivity coalition. This case is exemplified by USX, a 
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company which has so little commitment to steel that it has taken 
the word out of its name. In such a case, it is better for the union 
to try to block subcontracting (if it is strong enough). 
The fight against subcontracting in steel is facilitated by the 
technical difficulties involved in splitting up different parts of the 
steelmaking process. In contrast, an automobile is made up of 
many easily separable parts. But technical difficulties will not stop 
a determined company from subcontracting. Since union victories 
in arbitration have made it hard for USX to bring subcontractors 
into plants to work, US Steel management in Gary has begun send-
ing equipment out of the plant for maintenance—including huge 
items such as a transfer car, which is used for hauling iron ore 
and weighs as much as two locomotives. The moving process alone 
took one day and cost several thousand dollars, not including the 
cost of downtime. 
However, it seems possible that if the union is strong enough, 
it will be able to show management the wisdom of "if you can't 
beat them, join them," especially if management is committed to 
staying in the business of producing high-quality products. At 
USWA Local 1010, the union's persistence on subcontracting has 
forced the issue higher in the organization, where there is 
somewhat more openness to the idea of a productivity coalition. 
Senior management has acknowledged that in some cases, keeping 
the work in-house has saved the company money. In addition, the 
union forced the company to keep open shops (such as a forge, 
a foundry, and a motor shop) during a period of what local presi-
dent Mezo calls "panic de-industrialization," when other firms 
closed theirs. These operations are now profitable since they take 
in work from companies that closed their shops. 
If management is willing to consider innovative approaches to 
regaining competitiveness, then a productivity coalition may be 
feasible, as at AC Rochester. This union strategy is tricky to imple-
ment, however, because it requires continuous re-evaluation: 
When is it better to accept the loss of work than to make con-
cessions? Is this concession really necessary to make the company 
competitive? Is a given change in work practices (such as a combi-
nation of trades) really a more efficient way of doing things, or 
is it just a clever form of exploitation which has large hidden costs 
(such as reduced safety due to reduced worker training)? If a union 
local does not carefully weigh the costs and benefits of each 
concession, and is not in close contact with other locals, a produc-
tivity coalition can degenerate into union participation in manage-
ment's adaptation strategy. While such a tactic may at times 
benefit an individual plant, it will facilitate management's efforts 
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to play one plant against another, thus weakening the unionized 
sector as a whole. 
Some union practices will improve the effectiveness of all three 
strategies. First, unions need to become more involved in manage-
ment. Greater knowledge of the sources of costs and revenues 
obviously helps in designing and implementing productivity 
coalitions. But (somewhat to their surprise) unions pursuing the 
other two strategies have also found themselves deeply enmeshed 
in what traditionally has been management territory: participating 
in contracting decisions in the case of attempts to prevent sub-
contracting, participating in workforce assignments in the case 
of job banking. 
Second, unions need greater rank-and-file involvement, to come 
up with suggestions for improved productivity, and to alert union 
officers of management's use of outside personnel in violation of 
the contract. The USWA contract facilitates such rank-and-file 
activism, because the back pay awarded for contract violations 
goes directly to the affected workers. 
Thirdly, the fight against subcontracting requires unions to 
become effective leaders of their members on the shopfloor. To 
the extent that U.S. employers emphasize quality and just-in-time 
production, workers will gain new power through their ability to 
work together to perform smoothly a sequence of tasks that are 
not individually complicated, but which require teamwork. If 
unions can harness the skills of these teams, rather than allow 
management to control them, they can gain new leverage in 
collective bargaining. 
Public Policy Responses to Subcontracting 
Even if unions learn both to become more adept at management 
tasks and to mobilize the rank and file, their ability to mitigate 
the effects of subcontracting will depend on their ability to change 
public policy as well. As the USWA and UAW have recognized, 
the effectiveness of each of the three collective-bargaining 
strategies outlined above is significantly influenced by the political 
environment. 
Unions are using two basic political strategies. First, they have 
lobbied for quotas and "voluntary export agreements" to limit the 
foreign competition which provided the impetus for subcontrac-
ting. This strategy is becoming less and less effective against sub-
contracting in the auto industry because it doesn't prevent foreign 
firms from setting up new, nonunion plants in the United States 
(although it does put limits on firms' ability to use super low-wage 
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labor abroad). 
The UAW has also proposed, with less success, measures to put 
new and old plants on a level playing field by stopping states from 
trying to outbid each other with subsidies to win new plants, and 
by socializing pension and health-care costs, which are far greater 
for older plants. 
The second political strategy is to try to reduce the benefits of 
subcontracting directly. A recent example is the passage of legisla-
tion requiring advance notification for plant closings. The UAW 
is also working to strengthen the technical base of heavily-
unionized areas. It is doing this by working with state agencies 
such as the Michigan Modernization Service and the state of New 
York, and university-based projects such as the Programs for 
Employment and Workplace Systems at Cornell. 
These political efforts increase the effectiveness of the collective 
bargaining strategies. To the extent that subcontracting is made 
more expensive (because companies are forced to pay more of the 
social costs of their actions) or in-house operations become more 
productive (through training programs), management has less 
incentive to violate agreements blocking subcontracting, and a 
productivity coalition has more of a chance to develop. 
Conclusion 
Unions are adopting three collective bargaining strategies for 
limiting the impact of subcontracting. The Steelworkers have 
pioneered with negotiated limits on outsourcing. The UAW has 
developed elaborate programs to provide income security. And 
some union locals are joining "productivity coalitions" to win 
work that management might otherwise outsource. 
Which strategy should a local union choose? Unions' overall goal 
should be to take workers' standard of living out of competition. 
When management is following an innovation strategy, trying to 
become more competitive by improving product quality and 
efficiency, unions should not aim to prohibit subcontracting for 
three reasons. First, management is unlikely to agree to this. 
Second, to the extent it does agree, efficiency is hurt, and long-
term job preservation is jeopardized. Finally, and most importantly, 
it makes unions look like a special-interest group—which hinders 
the development of the coalitions necessary for the political 
strategy to succeed. In particular, unions should not try to block 
subcontracting to other union firms. 
Unions should aim to protect workers from the effects of stupid 
or self-interested management, however. That is, they should try 
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to stop subcontract ing of the adaptive variety. 
Labor political action to make subcontract ing less profitable is 
an essential componen t of any collective bargaining strategy. 
Finally, organizing nonun ion subcontractors would go a long 
way to solving the problem, though it 's easier said than done. The 
UAW's recent commi tmen t to s tep u p organizing of nonun ion 
shops is an impor tan t s tep in the right direction. • 
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